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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ANDU.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
United States Adjusts Aid to Egypt in Light of Legal and Political Developments
Rapidly changing circumstances in theMiddleEast have complicated the longstandingU.S.
policy of sending military and financial aid to Egypt. After the Egyptian military removed the
democratically elected government in 2013, Congress legislated new restrictions on foreign
assistance. Nevertheless, for a time, the administration continued to send substantial aid by
using statutory waiver authority and declining to make the determination that would trigger
further cuts.At least partly in response tootherdevelopments in the region,Congress later loos-
ened some restrictions on foreign aid. In response, President Barack Obama’s administration
has restored essentially Egypt’s entire package of military and financial assistance.
In 2011, nationwide protests led to the sudden resignation of Egyptian President Hosni
Mubarak.1Those events prompted a newpresidential election in 2012,which resulted in a vic-
tory for Mohammed Morsi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood party.2 Morsi remained in
office until July 2013, when General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi led a military takeover that deposed
the civilian government.3
Morsi’s election and subsequent forcible removal complicated the continuation of Amer-
ican aid to Egypt. First, Congress imposed statutory restrictions that conditioned aid to Egypt
on democratic reforms.4 In order for Egypt to receive military funding, Congress required the
U.S. secretary of state to certify that the “Government of Egypt is supporting the transition to
civilian government including holding free and fair elections; implementing policies to protect
freedomof expression, association, and religion, anddueprocess of law.”5 Second, a longstand-
ing provision in Congress’s annual foreign appropriations act, Section 7008, prohibits the
United States fromproviding assistance “to the government of any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed bymilitary coup d’e´tat or decree or, after the date of enactment
of this Act, a coup d’e´tat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role.”6 Section 7008
applies to the vast majority of economic and military assistance to Egypt.7
Despite these restrictions, the Obama administration continued to provide aid to Egypt
duringMorsi’s time in office and immediately after Sisi ascended to power. In doing so, it dealt
1 Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AJIL 298, 310 (2012).
2 DavidD.Kirkpatrick,Named Egypt’s Winner, Islamist Makes History, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2012, at A1, avail-
able at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/25/world/middleeast/mohamed-morsi-of-muslim-brotherhood-
declared-as-egypts-president.html.
3 David D. Kirkpatrick, Army Ousts Egypt’s President; Morsi is Taken Into Military Custody, N.Y. TIMES, July 3,
2013, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html.
4 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, § 7041(a)(1)(B), 125 Stat. 786 (2011).
5 Id. § 7041(a)(1)(B).
6 Id. § 7008. Since FY1986, Congress has included the coup provision in its annual appropriation laws. JEREMY
M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43183, EGYPT IN CRISIS: ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013). For a dis-
cussionof how theObama administration interpreted Section7008 in the context of aid toMali, see JohnR.Crook,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL 431, 466–68 (2013).
7 SHARP, supra note 6, at 5. The vast majority of U.S. aid to Egypt is financed from three accounts: Foreign
Military Financing, Economic Support Funds, and International Military Education and Training. JEREMY M.
SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33003, EGYPT: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 17 (2015). Egypt
also receives severalmilliondollars annually from theNonproliferation,Antiterrorism,Demining, andRelatedPro-
grams account and the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account. Id. at 17 n.57.
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with the two statutory provisions in different ways. InMarch 2012 and June 2013, the admin-
istration invoked a provision that waived the Egypt-specific restrictions if the Secretary deter-
mined that continued aid was “in the national security interest of the United States.”8 Sepa-
rately, the White House asserted that it could avoid suspending aid to Egypt pursuant to the
general “coup” restriction by declining to determine whether Sisi had overthrown a democrat-
ically elected government.9 Although Section 7008 requires theUnited States to terminate aid
if it determines that a foreign coup has occurred, the administration asserted that the law did
not require the president to affirmatively determine whether the Egyptian military had over-
thrown Morsi’s government.10 Summarizing the administration’s position on the “coup”
restriction, State Department Spokesperson Jen Psaki stated that “[t]he law does not require
us to make a formal determination . . . as to whether a coup took place, and it is not in our
national interest to make such a determination.”11
The administration revised its foreign aid policy after the Egyptian military killed hun-
dreds of protesters in Cairo in August 2013. Obama stated that “while we want to sustain
our relationship with Egypt, our traditional cooperation cannot continue as usual when
civilians are being killed in the streets and rights are being rolled back.”12 On October 9,
2013, the Obama administration thus announced that it would suspend a large portion
of its annual military and financial aid to Egypt,13 including a delivery of military equip-
ment, a $300 million loan guarantee, and $260 million in general funds for the Egyptian
budget.14 The administration stated that it would continue to support Egyptian human-
itarian aid programs, counterterrorism operations, border security, and military training.
In testimony to Congress explaining the decision to withhold what other officials
described as “hundreds of millions of dollars” in aid,15 Assistant Secretary of State Eliz-
abeth Jones stated that the administration was “disappointed by the actions that [Egypt]
8 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton waived the democratization requirement on March 23, 2012 to release
FY2012 assistance to Egypt. U.S. Support for Egypt, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 23, 2012), at http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/03/186709.htm. Secretary of State John Kerry waived the democratization requirement onMay
10, 2013 to release FY2013 assistance to Egypt. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( June 7, 2013), at http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/06/210413.htm#EGYPT.
9 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 26, 2013), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/07/
212484.htm#EGYPT.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Remarks by the President on the Situation in Egypt, THEWHITE HOUSE (Aug. 15, 2013), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/15/remarks-president-situation-egypt.
13 Michael R. Gordon &Mark Landler, In Crackdown Response, U.S. Temporarily Freezes Some Military Aid to
Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2013, at A11.
14 Next Steps on Egypt Policy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 113thCong. 15–16, 21–22 (2013)
[hereinafterNext Steps on Egypt Policy] (statement ofDerekChollet, Assistant Secretary ofDefense for International
Security,U.S.Department ofDefense& statement ofAlinaRomanowski,DeputyAssistantAdministrator, Bureau
for the Middle East, U.S. Agency for International Development).
15 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Oct. 10, 2013), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2013/10/
215296.htm; see also Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials on U.S. Assistance to Egypt, U.S. DEP’T
OF STATE (Oct. 9, 2013), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/10/215262.htm (“[I]t amounts to—and
again, dependingonhowyoudoyour calculationsoverwhat timeperiod—hundredsofmillionsofdollars and some
high-profile military systems that will not be delivered until there’s progress towards the inclusive democracy that
we want to see.”).
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took that resulted in the violence in August, that we could not pursue business as usual,
but that we supported the roadmap that they had outlined.”16
Despite the administration’s position that Section 7008 did not require the suspension of
aid, officials stated that the policies embodied by Section 7008 did inform the October 2013
decision tohalt aid temporarily. Shortly after the administration announced its changedpolicy,
Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the administration’s decision was “a reflection of a
policy in theUnited States under our law.We have a law passed by theUnited States Congress
regarding how certain events unfold with respect to the change of a government in a country,
andwe’re boundby that.”17 In a congressional hearing, Jones reiteratedKerry’s suggestion that
the coup provision informed the administration’s decision to suspend aid. In response to a
question as to whether the suspension of aid was required by law, Jones responded, “[Y]ou’re
asking about whether or not a coup took place.We decidedwe did not have tomake a decision
on that ormake a statement oneway or the other.”18Nonetheless, Jones stated that the admin-
istration “decided that [it] had to act consistent with the law” and could not “continue pro-
grams [in which it works] with government and public institutions and public authorities.”19
In January2014,Congress adoptednewappropriations legislation that removed someof the
restrictions on assistance to Egypt.20 In that legislation, Congress permitted military and eco-
nomic assistance to Egypt through designated funds, “notwithstanding any provision of law
restricting assistance for Egypt.”21 Second, Congress eliminated the secretary of state’s author-
ity to waive the Egypt-specific democratization requirements. In its place, Congress divided
assistance to Egypt into two categories.22 In the first category, Congress allowed funding for
existing contracts and for security projects related to counterterrorism, border security, non-
proliferation, and Sinai development.23 In the second category, the United States could allo-
cate additional military and economic assistance to Egypt only if the secretary of state certified
thatEgypt hadmet certain goals for democratization.24Congress permittedup to$975million
in additional assistance to Egypt if the secretary of state certified that Egypt had “held a con-
stitutional referendum, and is taking steps to support democratic transition in Egypt.”25 Con-
gress then permitted another $576.8 million in assistance if the secretary of state certified that
Egypt had “held parliamentary and presidential elections, and that a newly elected Govern-
ment of Egypt is taking steps to govern democratically.”26 Total assistance to Egypt, including
funding that required the democracy certification and funding that did not, could not exceed
approximately $1.5 billion.27
16 Next Steps on Egypt Policy, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Elizabeth Jones).
17 Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Nov. 3, 2013), at http://www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/216220.htm.
18 Next Steps on Egypt Policy, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Elizabeth Jones).
19 Id. at 44–45.
20 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, § 7401(a), 128 Stat. 5, 522–24 (2014).
21 Id. § 7041(a)(6).
22 Id. § 7041(a)(1–6).
23 Id. § 7041(a)(5).
24 Id. § 7041(a)(6).
25 Id. § 7041(a)(6)(A).
26 Id. § 7401(a)(6)(B).
27 Id. § 7401(a)(2–3).
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OnApril 22, 2014, the administration announced that itwouldpartially reverse its hold onmil-
itary andfinancial assistance toEgypt.28The administration said that it couldnot certify thatEgypt
had implemented democratic reforms but that it would continue to “urgeEgypt to follow through
on its commitment to transition todemocracy.”29Nonetheless, the administrationpledged topro-
vide Egypt with $650million inmilitary and economic funding and ten Apache helicopters.30 To
justify thenewdeliveriesof aid, theadministrationexplained that the2014AppropriationsActper-
mitted theUnited States to providemilitary assistance to Egypt without certifying that Egypt had
met the statute’s goals for democratic transition, so long as Egypt used the assistance for counter-
terrorism or other essential security functions.31 The administration stated that it believed that
“thesenewhelicopterswillhelp theEgyptianGovernmentcounter extremistswhothreatennot just
Egypt, but Israeli security as well as theUnited States” and that the $650million in fundingwould
support “critical security efforts.”32 An administration spokesperson seemed to suggest that there
wasnohardcaponaid toEgypt so longas itwasdesignated for essential security functionsandexist-
ing contracts, including counterterrorism.33
In2015,Congress restored the secretaryof state’s power towaive the requirement thatEgypt
pursue democratic policies. Similar to congressional appropriations from 2011 to 2013, Con-
gress’s 2015Egypt appropriationspermitted the secretaryof state towaive the requirement that
Egypt implement democraticmeasures if the secretary of state determined “that it is important
to the national security interest of the United States to provide such assistance.”34 Although
the appropriations measure encouraged Egypt to transition to democratic government, to
ensure equal rights for women and minorities, and to protect the freedom of speech, the sec-
retary of state’s waiver authority allowed the administration to prioritize national security over
Egypt’s progress towards democracy.35
InMarch 2015,Obama announced that the administration would restore the remainder of
the military assistance to Egypt that it had suspended in 2013.36 The administration empha-
sized that the United States and Egypt share common interests, including counterterrorism,
28 Readout of Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s Call with Egyptian Minister of Defense Col. General Sedki Sobhy, U.S.
DEP’T OF DEFENSE (Apr. 22, 2014), at http://archive.defense.gov/Releases/Release.aspx?ReleaseID16660.
29 Jen Psaki Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 23, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2014/04/225092.htm [hereinafter Psaki April 23 Briefing].
30 Id. Although the administration stated in October 2013 that it would continue funding for certain human-
itarian programs in Egypt, the April 23 announcement was the first time that the administration released any of the
$1.5 billion that Congress allocated to Egypt in 2014. U.S. Aid to Egypt, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Apr. 24, 2014),
at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/04/225147.htm.
31 Psaki April 23 Briefing, supra note 29. In order to partially restore aid, the administration also certified, as
required by Congress, that Egypt was sustaining its strategic relationship with the United States and maintaining
its obligations under the Israel-Egypt peace accord. Id.; see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 § 7401(a)(1).
32 Psaki April 23 Briefing, supra note 29.
33 Id. (spokesperson answering in the affirmativewhen asked: “You can release any fundswithin the amount that
has been appropriated, provided that they only go for those accepted purposes that are in the law, which I think
includes Sinai security, counterterrorism, et cetera?”).
34 Consolidated andFurtherContinuingAppropriationsAct, 2015, Pub. L.No. 113-235, §7041(a)(6)(C), 128
Stat. 2130, 2632–35 (2014).
35 Id. § 7041(a)(6)(A).
36 Readout of the President’s Call with President al-Sisi of Egypt, THEWHITEHOUSE (Mar. 31, 2015), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/03/31/readout-president-s-call-president-al-sisi-egypt [hereinafter
Readout of the President’s Call]. The administration announced that it would deliver to Egypt 12 F-16 fighter jets,
20 Harpoon missiles, and the parts necessary to assemble up to 125 M1A1 Abrams tanks. Peter Baker, Obama
Removes Weapons Freeze Against Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2015, at A1.
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regional security, and peace with Israel.37 While restoring military aid, the administration
restricted Egypt’s flexibility to purchase military equipment by terminating Egypt’s ability to
purchaseweapons through cash-flowfinancing,whichhad allowedEgypt topurchaseweapons
on credit in anticipation of future aid.38
InMay2015,Kerry exercisedhis authority towaive the requirements for democratization.39
Because of a variety of continued human rights abuses—including arresting peaceful protest-
ers, imprisoning supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, and arbitrary mass killings—Kerry
stated that he could not certify that Egypt hadmade progress towards democracy.40 But Kerry
also praised Egypt for providing theU.S.military preferential passage through the SuezCanal,
authorizing the United States to fly over Egyptian airspace, and assisting the United States in
its campaign against ISIS, and he stated that “it is important to the national security interest
of the United States to provide assistance to Egypt.”41
Human rights advocates have criticized the administration for restoring aid to Egypt, and
Senator Patrick Leahy has led opposition in Congress to the administration’s policy. Leahy,
who is the Ranking Member of the Senate Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and
Related Programs, placed a hold on the Obama administration’s delivery of ten Apache heli-
copters to Egypt in 2014, which he later withdrew.42 More recently, on July 20, 2015, Leahy
wrote a letter to theWhiteHouse asking whethermilitary aid to Egypt violates the Leahy Law,
which Congress incorporates into its annual foreign assistance appropriations.43 According to
the Leahy Law, the United States may not provide funding “for any training, equipment, or
other assistance for a unit of a foreign security force if the Secretary of Defense has credible
information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights.”44 According to
Leahy, Kerry’s submission toCongress onMay 12, 2015 acknowledged that the Egyptianmil-
itary has committed humanitarian abuses, which necessitates the suspension of military aid
under the Leahy Law.45 In contrast to Senator Leahy’s broad interpretation of the provision,
the State Department has interpreted the word “unit” narrowly to mean “the smallest oper-
ational group in the field . . . implicated in the reported violation,”46 which would require the
37 Readout of the President’s Call, supra note 36.
38 Peter Baker, Obama Removes Weapons Freeze Against Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2015, at A1.
39 Memorandumof Justification forCertificationUnder Section 7041(a)(6)(c) of theDepartment of State, For-
eign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Act, 2015 (May 12, 2015), available at http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/international/2015/egyptwaiver.pdf.
40 Id. at 2–6.
41 Id. at 1.
42 Patricia Zengerle, Senior U.S. Lawmaker Blocks Aid for Egyptian Military, REUTERS (Apr. 29, 2014), at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/29/us-usa-egypt-military-idUSBREA3S0NY20140429; Comment of Senator
Patrick Leahy, Chairman, State Department And Foreign Operations Subcommittee, On Aid To Egypt, U.S. SENATOR
PATRICK LEAHY OF VERMONT ( June 24, 2014), at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/comment-of-senator-pat-
rick-leahy-chairman-state-department-and-foreign-operations-subcommittee-on-aid-to-egypt-.
43 TheQuestionableLegality ofMilitaryAid toEgypt,N.Y.TIMES,Aug.19,2015, atA22 [hereinafterQuestionableLegality].
44 Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, § 8059(a), 128 Stat.
2130, 2267–68 (2014).
45 Questionable Legality, supra note 43.
46 U.S. Dep’t of State, Leahy Vetting: Law, Policy, Process, HUMANRIGHTS.GOV (Apr. 15, 2013), at http://
www.humanrights.gov/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/leahy-vetting-law-policy-and-process.pdf.
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secretary of defense to be aware of humanitarian abuses in theEgyptianmilitary at the battalion
level or its equivalent.47
P51 and Iran Reach Agreement on Iranian Nuclear Program; Obama Administration Seeks
Congressional Approval
On July 14, 2015, the United States, the other permanent members of the UN Security
Council, andGermany (theP51); theEuropeanUnion; and Iran reached anonbinding Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) concerning the scope and content of Iran’s nuclear
program.1 Framed as a political agreement, the deal struck by the JCPOA significantly limits
Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium for the next fifteen years; eliminates Iran’s capacity to pro-
duceweapons-grade plutonium for the next fifteen years; eases sanctions imposed by the inter-
national community on Iran for its nuclear program; and establishesmechanisms for oversight
by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With the finalization of the agreement,
attention turns to the domestic sphere, where the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act
(INARA) gives Congress sixty days from the signing of the JCPOA to review the plan before
President Barack Obama may waive statutory sanctions by executive action.2
Since 2006, Iran has been subject to UN sanctions for its failure to establish the exclusively
peaceful nature of its nuclear program.3 The United States and European Commission have
separately imposed additional sanctions.4OnNovember 24, 2013, theP51 and Iran reached
an agreement to limit Iranian nuclear development and alleviate some Western sanctions
through a Joint Plan of Action, in the hope that the new agreement would facilitate a “com-
prehensive solution” that would allow all remaining sanctions to be lifted.5 The Joint Plan of
Action called for a six-monthpause in Iran’s nuclear program; a limitationof Iran’s enrichment
activities;monitoring of Iran’s nuclear facilities; and theU.S. andEuropean parties’ agreement
to lift or suspend certain sanctions, refrain from imposing new ones, and permit the repatri-
ation of an unspecified amount of revenue held abroad.6 The parties began implementing the
JPOA in early 2014; they extended the deadlines for negotiating a final settlement several
times.7 In April 2015, the parties announced a breakthrough in negotiations,8 and on July 14,
2015, they reached a final settlement in the form of the JCPOA.
47 Id.
1 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/ [herein-
after JCPOA].
2 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, 129 Stat. 201 (2015). The House and Senate
ultimately did not take action to precludePresidentObama fromwaiving those sanctions, and the agreementwill be for-
mally adoptedonOctober 15, 2015.PeterBaker&JulieHirschfeldDavis,Nuclear Deal Sealed, Obama Must Now Make
It Work, and Mend Fences,N.Y.TIMES, Sept. 11, 2015, at A6. [Editors’ note: These developments inCongress occurred
after the cut-off date for this edition of theCPUS, but, for completeness, a reference has been added during production.]
3 S.C. Res. 1737 (Dec. 23, 2006); S.C. Res. 1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803 (Mar. 3, 2008); S.C. Res.
1929 ( June 9, 2010). Kristina Daugirdas & JulianDavisMortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States,
108 AJIL 94, 109 (2014).
4 U.S.DEP’TOFTREASURY, IRAN:WHATYOUNEEDTOKNOWABOUTU.S. ECONOMICSANCTIONS ( Jan.
23, 2012), available athttp://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/iran.pdf;EURO-
PEAN UNION, RESTRICTIVE MEASURES (SANCTIONS) IN FORCE ( July 31, 2013), available at http://eeas.europa.
eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.
5 Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 3, at 110.
6 Id.
7 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 407,
408 (2015).
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Chronologically, the JCPOA is structured with reference to five landmark days:
● First, “FinalizationDay” is July 14, 2015, the date the JCPOA negotiations were con-
cluded.9
● Second, “Adoption Day” occurs ninety days after UN Security Council endorses the
JCPOA. On Adoption Day, Iran will inform the IAEA that, effective on Implemen-
tation Day, it will provisionally apply the IAEA Additional Protocol, which among
other things permits increased inspections by the IAEA; in turn, the EuropeanUnion
and theUnited States will enact regulations and issue waivers necessary to begin sanc-
tions relief on Implementation Day.10 On July 20, 2015, the UN Security Council
commenced the ninety-day countdown to Adoption Day by unanimously adopting
Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA and established a monitoring process
and schedule for modifying UN sanctions during the implementation of the
JCPOA.11
● Third, “Implementation Day” will be the day that the IAEA certifies Iran has taken
the key nuclear steps described in the JCPOA.12 The obligations required to trigger
Implementation Day include changes to Iran’s heavy water reactor and capping
enrichment capacity.On ImplementationDay, theUNSecurity Council will lift cer-
tain sanctions. (As discussed below, all UN sanctions may “snap back” if there is non-
performance of JCPOAobligations.)TheEuropeanUnionwill terminate all of its eco-
nomic and financial sanctions.13 Certain waivers to U.S. statutory sanctions will take
effect,14 although the U.S. embargo will remain in place with limited exceptions.15
8 Joint Statement by EU High Representative Frederica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, EURO-
PEANUNION (Apr. 2, 2015), athttp://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm (announc-
ing that Iran and the P51 had agreed to “key parameters” for the JCPOA, with final details to be negotiated
throughout June 2015).
9 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 16.
10 Id. Furthermore, the IAEA announced that it had signed an agreement with Iran that allows the Agency
to resolve any outstanding questions related to the possible military dimension of Iran’s previous nuclear pro-
grams. IAEA Director General’s Statement and Road-Map for the Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding
Issues Regarding Iran’s Nuclear Program, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ( July 14, 2015), at
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-
clarification-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-program.
11 S.C. Res. 2231 ( July 20, 2015).
12 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 16.
13 Industries in which EU sanctions will be lifted include Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemicals; shipping, ship-
building, and transport; financial and banking services; and metal and software. JCPOA, supra note 1, at Annex II,
1–7.
14 U.S. sanctions waivers related to secondary sanctions against Iran, which are designed to target the activities
of non-U.S. persons or entities engaging in transactions with Iran, will take effect. Such waivers of statutory sanc-
tionswill permit transactions in certain industries, includingfinance andbanking, energy andpetrochemicals, auto-
mobiles, metals and software, and shipping. Furthermore, the Department of Treasury will license foreign subsid-
iaries of U.S. companies to engage in transactions with in Iran similar to those that would be permitted to non-U.S.
persons. Finally, a number of individuals and entities that were sanctioned for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear
programwill be removed from theDepartment of the Treasury’s sanctions lists (thoughU.S. persons will continue
to be prohibited from dealing with such parties unless authorized by Treasury). JCPOA, supra note 1, at Annex II,
12–15.
15 See Iranian Transactions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 560 (2011); Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. Part 535 (2012); see also Iran Sanctions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, at http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/sanctions/Programs/pages/iran.aspx (last visited July 31, 2015). U.S. statutory sanctions linked to
Iran’s “support for terrorism, human rights abuses, and missile activities will remain in effect and continue to be
enforced,” such as those imposed as the result of Section 105 of theComprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability,
andDivestment Act of 2010, which targeted individuals determined to be responsible for human rights abuses after
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● Fourth, on “Transition Day”—either eight years after Adoption Day or when the
IAEA has concluded that Iran’s nuclear program is entirely peaceful—Iran will seek
parliamentary ratification of the Additional Protocol. The United States and Euro-
pean Union will seek legislative action terminating nuclear-related economic sanc-
tions and some nonproliferation sanctions. And UN sanctions related to the acqui-
sition of ballistic missiles will terminate.16
● Fifth, “Termination Day” will occur ten years from Adoption Day. At that time, the
UN Security Resolution endorsing the JCPOA will terminate and the European
Union will terminate all remaining sanctions.17
As a substantivematter, the deal limits Iran’s ability to develop either uraniumor plutonium
at levels sufficient to create an atomic bomb. For fifteen years, Iran can continue producing a
small stock of uranium enriched at low levels—up to 3.67 percent, enough for civilian use but
insufficient for a bomb without further processing.18 These levels of enrichment, combined
with a two-thirds reduction in Iranian centrifuges, are designed to ensure that Iran would not
have enoughmaterial, or centrifuges running, to make a bomb’s worth of weapons-grade ura-
nium in less than a year (the “breakout” period). Analysts estimate that Iran currently has a
breakout timeof two to threemonths.19The stockpile of enricheduraniummust remainunder
300kilogramsof 3.67percent,with the excess tobe sold.All testingwithuraniumanduranium
enrichment must occur solely within the facility at Natanz.20
In addition, the formerly secret Fordow facilitywill be converted into a “nuclear, physics and
technology centre.”21 Iran and international partners will jointly engage in research there.
IAEA inspectorswill have daily access to the plant for fifteen years. The agreement requires that
all nuclear material be removed from Fordow, except for residual amounts of uranium from
past enrichment projects that will be subject to IAEA verification. For those fifteen years, no
uranium enrichment may take place at Fordow.22 Similarly, the Arak heavy water reactor will
be redesigned, with assistance from the P51, for industrial and medicinal research without
producing weapons-grade plutonium.23
If the IAEAhas concerns that Iran has undeclared nuclearmaterials or activities, or is engag-
ing in activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, IAEA inspectors can ask to visit relevant loca-
tions, after sharingwith Iran thebasis for their concerns.24At that point, Iranmay suggest alter-
native means of resolving the IAEA’s concerns. If the IAEA is unable to verify the absence of
the June 2009presidential election in Iran.DIANNEE.RENNACK,CONG.RESEARCHSERV., R43311, IRAN:U.S.
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ANDTHEAUTHORITY TOLIFTRESTRICTIONS 2–3 (2015), available at https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/mideast/R43311.pdf.
16 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 16; S.C. Res. 2231, supra note 11, ¶ 20.
17 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 16.
18 Id. at 6–7.
19 Michael Gordon & David Sanger, Deal Reached on Iran Nuclear Program; Limits on Fuel Would Lessen with
Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2015, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/
iran-nuclear-deal-is-reached-after-long-negotiations.html?_r0.
20 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 7.
21 JCPOA, supra note 1, at Annex I, 12.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 7–8.
24 Id. at 23.
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undeclared nuclear materials and activities inconsistent with the JCPOA within fourteen days
of the IAEA’s original request for access, then the Joint Commission may become involved.25
The Joint Commission is made up of the eight members that negotiated the JCPOA. The
Joint Commission will have up to seven days to review the dispute and decide what Iran needs
to do:
If the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with
the JCPOA cannot be verified after the implementation of the alternative arrangements
agreed by Iran and the IAEA, or if the two sides are unable to reach satisfactory arrange-
ments to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities
inconsistent with the JCPOA at the specified locations within 14 days of the IAEA’s orig-
inal request for access, Iran, in consultation with the members of the Joint Commission,
would resolve the IAEA’s concerns through necessary means agreed between Iran and the
IAEA. In the absence of an agreement, the members of the Joint Commission, by consen-
sus or by a vote of 5 or more of its 8 members, would advise on the necessary means to
resolve the IAEA’s concerns. The process of consultation with, and any action by, the
members of the Joint Commission would not exceed 7 days, and Iran would implement
the necessary means within 3 additional days.26
Since only five of the eight members need to agree on what to do, the provision above effec-
tively ensures that Iran, Russia, and China cannot combine to prevent action without the sup-
port of at least one other member of the Joint Commission. Iran then has three days to imple-
ment the decision.
The JointCommission alsooversees dispute resolution if anyof the JCPOAparticipant states
believes there has been “significant non-performance of commitments.”27 In such circum-
stances, the participant state can refer the issue to the Joint Commission.28 If the Joint Com-
missiondoes not resolve the issue, any individual JointCommissionmember can refer the issue
to the Security Council. In the Security Council, the members will vote on a draft resolution
to continue sanctions relief.29 Unless the resolution to continue sanctions relief is adopted
within thirty days of thenotification, the sanctions from2006–15will “apply in the sameman-
ner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution.” This is the snapback provision.30
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 17.
28 Id.Anyviolationof aCommissiondecision could trigger re-impositionof international sanctions. If anymem-
berbelieves that JCPOAcommitments arenotbeingmet, a35-daydispute resolutionprocess ensues, including refer-
ral to the foreignministers of Iran and the P51, and the establishment of anAdvisoryBoard to issue a non-binding
opinion to theCommission. If thesemeasures do not resolve the issue, anyCommissionmembermay refer the issue
to the Security Council in a procedure, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2231, that is described above and
could lead to re-imposition of sanctions.
29 S.C.Res. 2231, supranote 11, ¶11. (“[The SecurityCouncil] [d]ecides, acting underArticle 41 of theCharter
of the United Nations, that, within 30 days of receiving a notification by a JCPOA participant State of an issue that
the JCPOA participant State believes constitutes significant non-performance of commitments under the JCPOA,
it shall vote on a draft resolution to continue in effect the terminations in paragraph 7 (a) of this resolution, decides
further that if,within10daysof thenotification referred to above, noMemberof theSecurityCouncil has submitted
such a draft resolution for a vote, then the President of the Security Council shall submit such a draft resolution and
put it to a vote within 30 days of the notification referred to above, and expresses its intention to take into account
the views of the States involved in the issue and any opinion on the issue by the Advisory Board established in the
JCPOA.”).
30 Id. ¶ 12 (“[The Security Council] [d]ecides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,
that, if the Security Council does not adopt a resolution under paragraph 11 to continue in effect the terminations
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Any individual permanent member of the Security Council (most likely the United States,
France, or theUnitedKingdom) can effectively reimposeUN sanctions on Iran by vetoing the
resolution continuing sanctions relief.31
The snapback provision is set to expire in ten years’ time. However, according to a letter
signed by the foreign ministers of the P51, the countries plan to introduce another Security
Council resolution extending the snapback provision for five years after the ten years have
elapsed “in the event of Iran’s significant nonperformance.”32
Before the passage of Resolution 2231, Obama heralded its anticipated snapback provision
as the primary mechanism to ensure that Iran complies with the terms of the agreement, not-
ing:
Over the course of the next decade, Iranmust abide by the deal before additional sanctions
are lifted. . . . All of this will bememorialized and endorsed in a newUnitedNations Secu-
rity Council resolution. And if Iran violates the deal, all of those sanctions will snap back
into place. So there’s a very clear incentive for Iran to follow through, and there are very
real consequences for a violation.33
Some commentators have argued that themechanismmay not be as effective as theObama
administration claims it will be because of the procedures required before the snapback
occurs, or because Iran is effectively permitted to walk away from the JCPOA commit-
ments if a snapback does occur.34
Separately, the JCPOA also provides that both the United States and EU will refrain from
reintroducing or reimposing the nuclear-related sanctions they terminated pursuant to the
JCPOA. Iran indicated that it will treat such reintroduction or reimposition as grounds for ter-
minating its own commitments under the JCPOA in whole or in part:
The EU will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions that it has termi-
nated implementing under this JCPOA, without prejudice to the dispute resolution pro-
cess provided for under this JCPOA. There will be no new nuclear related UN Security
Council sanctions and no new EU nuclear-related sanctions or restrictive measures. The
United States will make best efforts in good faith to sustain this JCPOA and to prevent
interference with the realisation of the full benefit by Iran of the sanctions lifting specified
in Annex II. The U.S. Administration, acting consistent with the respective roles of the
President and the Congress, will refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions
specified in Annex II that it has ceased applying under this JCPOA, without prejudice to
in paragraph 7 (a), then effective midnight Greenwich Mean Time after the thirtieth day after the notification to
the SecurityCouncil described in paragraph 11, all of the provisions of resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747
(2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), and 1929 (2010) that have been terminated pursuant to paragraph 7 (a) shall
apply in the samemanner as they applied before the adoption of this resolution, and themeasures contained in para-
graphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of this resolution shall be terminated, unless the Security Council decides otherwise.”).
31 Somini Sengupta, ‘Snapback’ is an Easy Way to Reimpose Iran Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2015, at A10,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/world/middleeast/snapback-is-easy-way-to-reimpose-iran-
penalties.html?_r0.
32 Id.
33 Statement by the President on Iran, THEWHITEHOUSE ( July 14, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/07/14/statement-president-iran [hereinafter Statement by the President on Iran]. See also Back-
ground Conference Call on Iran, THE WHITE HOUSE ( July 14, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2015/07/14/background-conference-call-iran.
34 Peter D. Feaver & Eric Lorber, Do the Iran Deal’s “Snapback” Sanctions Have Teeth?, FOREIGN POLICY ( July
21, 2015), at http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/21/do-the-iran-deals-snapback-sanctions-have-teeth.
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the dispute resolution process provided for under this JCPOA. The U.S. Administration,
acting consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Congress, will refrain
from imposing new nuclear-related sanctions. Iran has stated that it will treat such a re-
introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions specified inAnnex II, or such an imposition
of new nuclear-related sanctions, as grounds to cease performing its commitments under
this JCPOA in whole or in part.35
The JCPOA also provides that the United States will encourage state and local level officials to
take into account the changes in U.S. policy and lift their own sanctions regimes:
If a law at the state or local level in the United States is preventing the implementation of
the sanctions lifting as specified in this JCPOA, the United States will take appropriate
steps, taking into account all available authorities, with a view to achieving such imple-
mentation. The United States will actively encourage officials at the state or local level to
take into account the changes in the U.S. policy reflected in the lifting of sanctions under
this JCPOA and to refrain from actions inconsistent with this change in policy.36
Successful implementation of the deal would ultimately allow theUnited States and the Euro-
pean Union to approach Iran’s nuclear activities in a manner consistent with their approach
to other non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.37
In the meantime, the Obama administration has taken the position that that the deal does
not create binding international obligations. At a hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Secretary of State JohnKerry noted, “We’ve been clear from the beginning: we’re
not negotiating a, quote, legally binding plan.We’re negotiating a plan that will have in it the
capacity for enforcement.”38 Department of State spokesperson Jen Psaki reiterated this point
to reporters, characterizing the agreement as a political agreement:
[U]nlike a treaty or other types of international agreements in which parties are generally
required to take similar actions themselves, this deal will primarily reflect the international
community putting strong limits on Iran’s nuclear program and Iran making verifiable
and enforceable commitments to adhere to those limits. So these are political understand-
ings between a multi—several countries, as you know, through the P51.
. . .
Again, our focus has beenon technical details andon trying to reach the content of political
commitments—on what the political commitments would be by the participants.
. . .
[H]istorically, under many administrations, the United States has pursued important
international security initiatives throughnonbinding arrangementswhere that has been in
our national interest. In the arms control and nonproliferation area alone, some represen-
tative examples include the U.S.-Russia deal to remove chemical weapons from Syria, the
35 JCPOA, supra note 1, at 13.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 3 (“Successful implementation of this JCPOA will enable Iran to fully enjoy its right to nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the nuclearNon-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) in linewith its obli-
gations therein, and the Iranian nuclear programme will be treated in the same manner as that of any other non-
nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT.”).
38 BradleyKlapper,Kerry Says Congress Would Not Be Able to Change Terms of Iran Deal, PBSNEWSHOUR (Mar.
11, 2015), at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/kerry-says-congress-able-change-terms-iran-deal.
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Proliferation Security Initiative, the Nuclear Supplier Group Guidelines, the Missile
Technology Control Regime. There’s a lot of precedent for this being political commit-
ments made by all sides.39
When pressed further about whether the agreement “is somehow politically binding” but
“from an international legal perspective . . . not binding,” Psaki again pointed to the deal on
Syria’s chemicalweapons, noting that “this frameworkwasnot legally binding andwasnot sub-
ject to congressional approval. It outlined steps for eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons and
helped lay the groundwork for successful multilateral efforts to move forward.”40
WhiteHouse Press Secretary Josh Earnest also used such language to describe the deal, not-
ing that “a congressional vote on a nonbinding instrument is not required by law and could
set an unhelpful precedent for other negotiations that result in other nonbinding instru-
ments.”41 Likewise, Chief of Staff Denis McDonough wrote that “non-binding arrange-
ments—like the deal we are negotiating with Iran, and the United Kingdom, France, Ger-
many, Russia, andChina, and the EuropeanUnion—are an essential element of international
diplomacy and do not require congressional approval.”42
Legal commentators have endorsed the administration’s view that congressional approval of
political commitments is unnecessary.43
Two weeks after the agreement on key parameters for the JCPOA were announced in April
2015, theU.S. SenateForeignRelationsCommittee unanimously approved abipartisanbill—
the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 (INARA)—that would require congressional
reviewof the eventual deal with Iran andwould impose somedelays on presidential implemen-
tation.44 Substantial bipartisan majorities in both the House (400 to 25) and the Senate (99
to 1, with only SenatorTomCotton voting against it) passed the bill.45Obama had threatened
39 Jen Psaki, Daily Press Briefing,U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 10, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2015/03/238718.htm.
40 Id.
41 Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest,THEWHITEHOUSE ( Jan. 29, 2015), athttps://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/01/29/press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-12915.
42 Letter from Chief of Staff Denis McDonough to Senator Bob Corker, THE WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 14, 2015), at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/read-disputed-letters-center-iran-nuclear-pact.
43 See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith &Marty Lederman, The Case for the President’s Unilateral Authority to Conclude the
Impending Iran Deal is Easy Because It Will (Likely) be a Nonbinding Agreement Under International Law, LAWFARE
(Mar. 11, 2015), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/case-presidents-unilateral-authority-conclude-impending-iran-
deal-easy-because-it-will-likely-be. But see David Golove, Congress Just Gave the President Power to Adopt a Binding
Legal Agreement with Iran, JUST SECURITY (May 14, 2015), at https://www.justsecurity.org/23018/congress-gave-
president-power-adopt-binding-legal-agreement-iran (arguing that “[i]f the ‘non-binding’ character of the agree-
ment is no more than a diplomatic wink and a nod—a distinction of form without substance for the parties to the
agreement—then pursuing this course would arguably constitute an abuse of constitutional process, viz., an ille-
gitimate effort to make an end-run around Congress’s core constitutional powers”).
44 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, S. 615, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015) (as reported by S. Comm. on
Foreign Rel., Apr. 14, 2015).
45 All Bill Information (Except Text) for H.R. 1191—Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, CONGRESS.
GOV, at https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1191/all-info (last visited July 31, 2015).
2015] 655CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 18:05:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
to veto the initial version of the bill, citing the risks it posed to continuing negotiations,46 but
signed the version passed by Congress into law on May 22, 2015.47
Under INARA, Obama must give Congress sixty days from the signing of the JCPOA to
review the deal before he may waive statutory sanctions, eliminating the possibility of imme-
diate U.S. sanctions relief for Iran.48 During this window, Congress has the ability to pass a
joint resolution of disapproval. While the text of INARA states that a vote of congressional
approval is not required for the “commence[ment]” of the agreementwith Iran, it provides that
onlyCongress can “permanentlymodify or eliminate” any existing “statutory sanctions”49 that
were enacted as legislation:
(c) EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR
AGREEMENTSWITH IRAN.—
(1) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—
(A) the sanctions regime imposed on Iran byCongress is primarily responsible
for bringing Iran to the table to negotiate on its nuclear program;
(B) these negotiations are a critically importantmatter of national security and
foreign policy for the United States and its closest allies;
(C) this section does not require a vote by Congress for the agreement to com-
mence;
(D) this section provides for congressional review, including, as appropriate,
for approval, disapproval, or no action on statutory sanctions relief under
an agreement; and
(E) even though the agreement may commence, because the sanctions regime
was imposed by Congress and only Congress can permanently modify or
eliminate that regime, it is critically important that Congress have the
opportunity, in an orderly and deliberative manner, to consider and, as
appropriate, take action affecting the statutory sanctions regime imposed
by Congress.
(2) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, action involv-
ing any measure of statutory sanctions relief by the United States pursuant to
an agreement subject to subsection (a) or the Joint Plan of Action—
46 Julia Edwards,Obama to Veto Bill Letting Congress Weigh in on Iran Deal, REUTERS (Feb. 28, 2015), at http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/01/us-iran-nuclear-usa-obama-idUSKBN0LX11320150301.
47 Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 606, H.R. 651, H.R. 1075, H.R. 1191, S. 1124, THEWHITEHOUSE
(May 22, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/22/statement-press-secretary-hr-606-
hr-651-hr-1075-hr-1191-s-1124.
48 Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-17, § 135(b), 129 Stat. 201 (2015).
49 Id. § 135(b)(6)(C). It is not entirely clear which sanctions are included under “statutory sanctions” as INARA
does not define the term. INARA does suggest—with the inclusion of language regarding the “sense of Congress”—
that theremaybe a distinctionbetween sanctions imposedon Iran for nuclear activities andother sanctions imposed
on Iran, expressing an expectation fromCongress that “United States sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights
abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under an agreement.” Id. § 135(c), (d)(7).
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(A) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such
action, if, during the period for review provided in subsection (b), there is
enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that theCongress does favor
the agreement;
(B) may not be taken if, during the period for review provided in subsection
(b), there is enacted a joint resolution stating in substance that theCongress
does not favor the agreement; or
(C) may be taken, consistent with existing statutory requirements for such
action, if, following the period for review provided in subsection (b), there
is not enacted any such joint resolution.50
INARA also summarizes several possible actions that Congress may take during the review
period and their potential impact on the enforcement of any nuclear agreement with Iran. If
Congress either fails to act or passes a joint resolution approving the agreement, the INARA
restrictions on JCPOA implementation terminate. However, if Congress passes a joint resolu-
tion of disapproval, the restrictions remain in place for twelve days after the passage of the joint
resolution of disapproval. If the president vetoes such a joint resolution, the INARA restrictions
remain in place for ten days following this veto, pending congressional reconsideration of the
resolution of disapproval.
There is, however, no specific provision in INARA setting forth the consequences of a con-
gressional override of a presidential veto. Thus, in relevant part:
(b) PERIOD FOR REVIEW BY CONGRESS OF NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS
WITH IRAN.—
(1) INGENERAL.—During the 30-calendar day period following transmittal by
the President of an agreement pursuant to subsection (a), the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives shall, as appropriate, hold hearings and briefings and
otherwise obtain information in order to fully review such agreement.
(2) EXCEPTION.—The period for congressional review under paragraph (1)
shall be 60 calendar days if an agreement, including all materials required to be
transmitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (a)(1), is transmitted pursuant
to subsection (a) between July 10, 2015, and September 7, 2015.
(3) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING INITIAL CONGRESSIONAL
REVIEWPERIOD.—Notwithstandinganyotherprovisionof law,exceptaspro-
vided in paragraph (6), prior to andduring the period for transmission of an agree-
ment in subsection (a)(1) and during the period for congressional review provided
inparagraph (1), includinganyadditionalperiodas applicableunder the exception
provided in paragraph (2), the Presidentmay not waive, suspend, reduce, provide
relief from, or otherwise limit the application of statutory sanctionswith respect to
Iran under any provision of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pur-
suant to an agreement described in subsection (a).
50 Id. § 135(c).
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(4) LIMITATION ON ACTIONS DURING PRESIDENTIAL CONSIDER-
ATIONOFAJOINTRESOLUTIONOFDISAPPROVAL.—Notwithstanding
anyother provisionof law, except as provided inparagraph (6), if a joint resolution
of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of Congress,
the President may not waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise
limit the applicationof statutory sanctionswith respect to Iranunder anyprovision
of law or refrain from applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement
described in subsection (a) for a period of 12 calendar days following the date of
such passage.
(5) LIMITATIONONACTIONSDURINGCONGRESSIONALRECONSID-
ERATION OF A JOINT RESOLUTION OF DISAPPROVAL.—Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, except as provided in paragraph (6), if a joint
resolution of disapproval described in subsection (c)(2)(B) passes both Houses of
Congress, and the President vetoes such joint resolution, the President may not
waive, suspend, reduce, provide relief from, or otherwise limit the application of
statutory sanctions with respect to Iran under any provision of law or refrain from
applying any such sanctions pursuant to an agreement described in subsection (a)
for a period of 10 calendar days following the date of the President’s veto.51
Obama has stated that he “will veto any legislation that prevents the successful implementation
of thisdeal,” shouldCongresspass a resolutiondisapprovingof the agreement.52Opponentswould
then need two-thirds of Congress to override the veto. On July 23, 2015, in testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Kerry argued that the JCPOA was the most realistic option
available to limit Iran’s nuclear program—particularly in light of past attempts to negotiate similar
agreements—and urgedCongress to support the agreement: “[T]he alternative to the deal that we
have reached is not . . . a ‘better deal,’ some sort of unicorn arrangement involving Iran’s complete
capitulation. . . .Thechoiceweface isbetweenanagreementthatwillensureIran’snuclearprogram
is limited, rigorously scrutinized, and wholly peaceful, or no deal at all.”53
United States Authorizes New Sanctions Program Aimed at Foreign Perpetrators of Cyberattacks
and Cyberexploits
OnApril1,2015,PresidentBarackObamaissuedExecutiveOrder13,694,whichpermitstheimpo-
sitionof sanctionson individualsor entities foundtohaveengaged inmalicious cyber-enabledactivities,
including economic espionage, that threaten a significant interest of theUnited States.1 The order
would block the property and interests in property [in the United States] of:
any person determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney
General and the Secretary of State, to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in,
51 Id. § 135(b)2.
52 Statement by the President on Iran, supra note 33; see also supra note 2.
53 Sec’y of State John Kerry, Opening Remarks Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,U.S.DEP’TOFSTATE
( July 23, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/07/245221.htm.
1 Statement by the President on Executive Order “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant
Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities”, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/04/01/statement-president-executive-order-blocking-property-certain-persons-en.
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directly or indirectly, cyber-enabled activities originating from, or directed by persons located,
in whole or in substantial part, outside theUnited States that are reasonably likely to result in,
or have materially contributed to, a significant threat to the national security, foreign policy,
or economichealthorfinancial stabilityof theUnitedStates and thathave thepurposeor effect
of:
● harming, or otherwise significantly compromising the provision of services by, a com-
puter or network of computers that support one or more entities in a critical infra-
structure sector;
● significantly compromising the provision of services by one or more entities in a crit-
ical infrastructure sector;
● causing a significant disruption to the availability of a computer or network of com-
puters; or
● causing a significant misappropriation of funds or economic resources, trade secrets,
personal identifiers, or financial information for commercial or competitive advantage
or private financial gain.2
The order also authorizes sanctions against any person or entity determined by the secretary
of the treasury, in consultation with the attorney general and the secretary of state,
● to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, the receipt or use for com-
mercial or competitive advantage or private financial gain, or by a commercial entity,
outside the United States of trade secrets misappropriated through cyber-enabled
means, knowing they have beenmisappropriated,where themisappropriation of such
trade secrets is reasonably likely to result in, or has materially contributed to, a signif-
icant threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economic health or financial
stability of the United States;
● tohavematerially assisted, sponsored, or providedfinancial,material, or technological
support for, or goods or services in support of, certain malicious cyber-enabled activ-
ities described in the order or any person whose property and interests in property are
blocked pursuant to the order;
● to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of,
directly or indirectly, any personwhose property and interests in property are blocked
pursuant to the order; or
● to have attempted to engage in any of the malicious activities described in the order.3
In the order, Obama declared a national emergency relating to the “unusual and extraor-
dinary threat” presented by “the increasing prevalence and severity ofmalicious cyber-enabled
activities” by actors located outside theUnited States.4 This declaration activated his authority
2 Letter—“Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities”,
THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/letter-block-
ing-property-certain-persons-engaging-significant-malicious- [hereinafter Letter]; see alsoExec.OrderNo. 13,694,
80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015).
3 Letter, supra note 2; see also Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. at 18,077–78.
4 Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. at 18,077. For other examples of geographically open-ended states of
emergency see SeanD.Murphy,Contemporary Practice of theUnited States, 96AJIL237, 241 (2002) (declaration
of emergency relating to international terrorism in Executive Order 13,224) and John R. Crook, Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 105 AJIL 709, 709 (2011) (declaration of emergency relating to transnational orga-
nized crime).
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to impose sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).5 The
executive order delegates to the secretary of the treasury “all powers granted to the President
by IEEPA as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of th[e] order,”6 and authorizes the
Treasury’sOffice of ForeignAssets Control (OFAC) to “work in coordinationwith otherU.S.
government agencies to identify individuals and entities whose conduct meets the criteria set
forth in [the order] and designate them for sanctions.”7 Special Assistant to the President and
Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel noted that the United States was not simultane-
ously “announcing any designations” pursuant to the order, but was instead “putting in place
the framework so that it’s available for [the United States] to respond, if [it] needed to rapidly,
to an emerging cyber threat.”8
The precise impetus for the order remains unclear. Although the order has been “[i]n the
works for two years,”9 some have speculated that its recent issuance may have been prompted
by growing concerns about the cybertheft of corporate trade secrets by hackers based in Russia
andChina,10 including a cyberespionage incident inMay 2014 connected toChinesemilitary
hackers.11Others have cited the cyberattack allegedlyperpetratedbyNorthKorean individuals
against Sony Pictures as a motivating factor behind the order.12 But administration officials
have declined to comment on the connection, if any, of the order to those particular events.13
Indeed, Department of the Treasury Acting Director for OFAC John Smith noted that the
order “is not targeted at any one country or region.”14 In addition, the orderwas issuedwithout
an initial set of designations for sanctions,15 undermining the implication of a direct link to the
China and North Korea incidents.
5 See International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–02 (2012).
6 Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. at 18,079.
7 FAQ 444, OFAC FAQs: Other Sanctions Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, at http://www.treasury.
gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_other.aspx#cyber (last visited July 18, 2015) [hereinafter OFAC
FAQs].
8 On-the-Record Press Call on the President’s Executive Order, “Blocking the Property of Certain Persons Engaging
in Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities”, THEWHITEHOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), athttps://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2015/04/01/record-press-call-president-s-executive-order-blocking-property-certain- [here-
inafter Press Call].
9 Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Establishes Sanctions Program to Combat Cyberattacks, Cyberspying, WASH. POST, Apr.
2, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-to-establish-sanctions-pro-
gram-to-combat-cyberattacks-cyberspying/2015/03/31/7f563474-d7dc-11e4-ba28-f2a685dc7f89_story.html.
10 Obama Signs Order Creating New Cyber Sanctions Program, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2015, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/aponline/2015/04/01/us/politics/ap-us-obama-cyber-sanctions-.html? [hereinafterCyber Sanctions Program].
11 See id.; see also Nakashima, supra note 9.
12 See Cyber Sanctions Program, supranote 10; see alsoCassie Spodak,Obama Announces Executive Order on Sanc-
tions Against Hackers, CNN (Apr. 1, 2015), at http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/01/politics/obama-cyber-hackers-
executive-order.
13 Press Call, supra note 8 (“[S]peculating how we would have used this tool in the past is very difficult because
the circumstances are going to vary, and we didn’t have the benefit of having this tool when we went through the
policy discussions.”).
14 Id.
15 FAQ 445, OFAC FAQs, supra note 7.
660 [Vol. 109THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 18:05:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
The sanctions permitted by the order—freezing of assets located in the United States and
prohibition of transactionswithU.S. parties16—are consistentwith those in other recent exec-
utive orders.17YetDaniel acknowledged that theorder is “thefirst of its kind in this spacewhere
[the United States] do[es]n’t have to rely on a sanctions regime that is, in fact, targeted at a
particular country or group of actorswithin a country, but ismore broad-brushed than that.”18
Likewise, Smith distinguished previous executive orders authorizing sanctions based on “par-
ticular criteria that relate to . . . jurisdictions” likeNorthKorea and Iran from this order, which
“allow[s] [the United States] to target activity wherever the attack activity that threatens the
U.S. interests may occur . . . .”19 He compared the activity-based focus of the order to similar
frameworks for counterterrorist, narcotics, and other international law enforcement programs
used by the United States.20
The determination of what constitutes malicious “cyber-enabled activities” subject to sanc-
tions is thus crucial to the scope of the order. The order does not explain the meaning of that
phrase. OFAC, however, has indicated that it anticipates promulgating regulations defining
“cyber-enabled activities” as “any act[s] that [are] primarily accomplished through or facili-
tated by computers or other electronic devices.”21 OFAC clarified further that
malicious cyber-enabled activities include deliberate activities accomplished through
unauthorized access to a computer system, including by remote access; circumventing one
ormore protectionmeasures, including bybypassing a firewall; or compromising the secu-
rity of hardware or software in the supply chain. These activities are often the means
through which the specific harms enumerated in the [executive order] are achieved,
including compromise to critical infrastructure, denial of service attacks, or massive loss
of sensitive information, such as trade secrets and personal financial information.22
In addition, those cyberenabled activities become sanctionable if, among other things, the
actions harm a “critical infrastructure sector.”23 The order defines that term as the “designated
critical infrastructure sectors identified in Presidential Policy Directive 21,”24 which identifies
a number of economic sectors that “provide[] the essential services that underpin American
society.”25 Since sanctions can alsobe issued for any attackharming anorganization supporting
16 Press Call, supra note 8.
17 See, e.g., Exec. OrderNo. 13,687, 80 Fed. Reg. 819, 819 ( Jan. 2, 2015) (imposing sanctions related toNorth
Korean cyberattack on Sony Pictures); Exec. Order No. 13,661, 79 Fed. Reg. 15,535, 15,535 (Mar. 16, 2014)
(imposing sanctions related to Russian annexation of Crimea).
18 Press Call, supra note 8. Daniel further noted that the sanctions were focused on “the activity and the harm
involved” instead of location because “cyber incidents tend to flow very easily across international boundaries,
and . . . trying to tie that to particular locations just didn’t make sense . . . .” Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.; see also Nakashima, supra note 9 (noting that the order “is modeled in part after regimes that have been
used . . . for counterterrorism and counterproliferation purposes”).
21 FAQ 447, OFAC FAQs, supra note 7.
22 Id.
23 See Exec. Order No. 13,694, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077 (Apr. 2, 2015).
24 Id. at 18,078;Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,THEWHITEHOUSE
(Feb. 12, 2013), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil [hereinafterPresidential Policy Directive]. See also JohnR.Crook,Contem-
porary Practice of the United States, 107 AJIL 447, 447–48 (2013) (discussing executive order on critical infra-
structure sectors issued the same day as PDD 21).
25 The sectors specified in the order are: Chemical, Commercial Facilities, Communications, Critical Manu-
facturing, Dams, Defense Industrial Base, Emergency Services, Energy, Financial Services, Food and Agriculture,
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those sectors, Smith acknowledged that the order could, in theory, be used to protect any eco-
nomic sector affected by a foreign cyberattack.26 Daniel clarified, however, that “it’s not just
anymalicious activity; it’s specific activity that is of a significant level to affect the national secu-
rity or the economic health of theUnited States, and that it is associated with one of those four
really important harms” specified in the order.27
Some commentators have questioned howbroadly the orderwill be implemented. A former
defense contractor executive said that the order gives the Obama administration “vast new
powers” to punish “even routine criminal hacking.”28 Similarly, a professional hacker charac-
terized the order as a “power grab” that was just “another salvo in President Obama’s war on
hackers . . . .”29 If broadly enforced, sanctions could create a “compliance nightmare for com-
panies”whowouldhave to avoidbusiness relationshipswithother companies possibly employ-
ing or benefitting from cyberattackers.30
Administration officials have responded by asserting that the order will only be used in a
narrow, targetedmanner.Obama said that “targeted sanctions [will be] used judiciously . . . to
go after the worst of the worst [cyber threats].”31 Furthermore, although the order authorizes
sanctions against companies that assist with or benefit from cyberattacks, sanctions “will in no
way target . . . unwitting victims . . . , like people whose computers are hijacked by botnets
[or] legitimate cybersecurity research community or professionals who help companies
improve their cybersecurity.”32 And according to Smith, the sanctions will be used to “com-
plement,” not replace, other international enforcement mechanisms, while Daniel stated that
the sanctions are only intended to “fill in a gap” in reaching cyberattackers in locations that are
“difficult for our diplomatic and law enforcement tools to reach” because of the host country’s
weak cybersecurity laws or non-cooperation with the United States.33
Government Facilities, Healthcare and Public Health, Information Technology, Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and
Waste, Transportation Systems, and Water and Wastewater Systems. Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 24.
26 Press Call, supra note 8.
27 Id. Smith asserted that “we have a responsibility to protect theUnited States from thosewho exploit our infor-
mation technologies to threaten our critical infrastructure, our economic health and financial stability, and other
core interests.”
28 Jeff Mason & Andrea Shalal, U.S. Targets Overseas Cyber Attackers with Sanctions Program, REUTERS (Apr.
2, 2015), at http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/us-usa-cybersecurity-idUSKBN0MS4DZ20150402.
29 Thomas Fox-Brewster, Obama Emergency Cyber Sanctions “Another Salvo in War on Legitimate Hackers”,
FORBES (Apr. 1, 2015), at http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2015/04/01/obama-cyber-sanctions-
war-on-legitimate-hackers.
30 See Mason& Shalal, supra note 28. See also Press Call, supra note 8 (“[W]e don’t want to just deter those that
are actuallywith their fingers on the keyboard, but also those that are behind those groups and that are funding those
groups and are enabling those groups to carry out their activity.”).
31 Barack Obama, A New Tool Against Cyber Threats, MEDIUM (Apr. 1, 2015), at https://medium.com/
@PresidentObama/a-new-tool-against-cyber-threats-1a30c188bc4; see also Michael Daniel, Our Latest Tool to
Combat Cyber Attacks: What You Need to Know, THEWHITE HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/blog/2015/04/01/our-latest-tool-combat-cyber-attacks-what-you-need-know (claiming that sanctions will
only be levied against “the worst of the worst of malicious cyber actors . . . .”).
32 Obama, supra note 31; see also Lisa Monaco, Expanding Our Ability to Combat Cyber Threats, THE WHITE
HOUSE (Apr. 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/04/01/expanding-our-ability-combat-cyber-
threats (noting that order would not be used to punish “legitimate cybersecurity researchers or innocent victims
whose computers are compromised”); FAQs 448–50, OFAC FAQs, supra note 7 (discussing intended targets of
sanctions under order).
33 Press Call, supra note 8.
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The order may also implicate questions about due process. The order provides that an indi-
vidual who has a “constitutional presence in theUnited States” can be designated for sanctions
without prior notice, sincemeasures taken to freeze a designated person’s assets under the order
would be “rendered ineffectual” in light of “the ability to transfer funds or other assets instan-
taneously” if prior notice was required.34 Any sanctioned person or entity could subsequently
challenge their designation, either through an administrative petition withOFAC or a lawsuit
in federal district court.35 But as one hacker points out, this optionwould not be available until
after the government, in his words, “arbitrarily seize[s]” a sanctioned person’s assets.36 None-
theless, Daniel asserted that the administration has improved its ability to properly attribute
the source of cyberattacks in the past several years, making the accurate designation of targets
for sanctions a “more tenable prospect,” even if it is “not a foregone conclusion . . . .”37
An “initial list of sanctioned entities often accompanies an executive order outlining new
sanctions,”38 including those orders related to cyberattacks.39 But because no initial designa-
tions were issued with this order, the sanctions authorized by the order are still an “empty
shell . . . .”40 But Daniel expressed confidence that when imposed, the sanctions would harm
cyberattackers by limiting their access toU.S. infrastructures.41Moreover, administrationoffi-
cials are hopeful that other countrieswill follow theUnited States and impose similar sanctions
programs, creating a coalition” that make sanctions for cyberattacks more effective.42
STATEDIPLOMATIC ANDCONSULAR RELATIONS
Normalization of Cuba-U.S. Relations Continues
In December 2014, President Barack Obama announced a major policy shift regarding the
relationship between the United States and Cuba, stating that he planned to “reestablish dip-
lomatic relations . . . , review Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism . . . [and]
take[] steps to increase travel, commerce, and the flow of information to and fromCuba.”1 In
34 Exec. Order 13,649, 80 Fed. Reg. 18,077, 18,078–79 (Apr. 2, 2015).
35 Press Call, supra note 8.
36 See Fox-Brewster, supra note 29.
37 Press Call, supra note 8.
38 John P. Barker, Ronald D. Lee&TomMcSorley, New Executive Order Authorizes Sanctions on Yet Unnamed
Perpetrators of Malicious Cyber Threats, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP (Apr. 17, 2015), at http://www.arnoldporter.
com/publications.cfm?actionadvisory&uNewExecutiveOrderAuthorizesSanctionsOnYetUnnamedPerpetratorsof
MaliciousCyberThreats&id1258.
39 See, e.g., Issuance of a New North Korea-related Executive Order; North Korea Designations, U.S.DEP’TOF THE
TREASURY ( Jan. 2, 2015), at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Pages/
20150102.aspx.
40 Stewart Baker,The President’s Sanctions Program for Hackers,WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2015, available at https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/04/01/the-presidents-sanctions-program-for-
hackers.
41 Daniel, supra note 31.
42 Press Call, supra note 8.
1 Statement by the President on Cuba Policy Changes, THEWHITEHOUSE (Dec. 17, 2014), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/the-press-office/2014/12/17/statement-president-cuba-policy-changes [hereinafter Cuba Policy Changes]; see also
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 109 AJIL 407, 415
(2015).
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the months that followed, the administration took several concrete steps to “end an outdated
approach” and “normalize relations” between the two nations.2
Perhaps most significantly, the executive branch rescinded Cuba’s designation as a state
sponsor of terror. In December, the president directed Secretary of State John Kerry to review
Cuba’s designation, reasoning that “[a]t a time when we are focused on threats from al Qaeda
to ISIL, a nation that meets our conditions and renounces the use of terrorism should not face
this sanction.”3 Following that review, Kerry recommended rescinding Cuba’s designation as
a state sponsor of terror.4 The legislatively prescribed rescission process ended in May 2015,5
at which time Kerry made the final decision to remove Cuba from the list of countries desig-
nated as state sponsors of terror.6 That decision immediately lifted a variety of sanctions on
Cuba under the Export Administration Act,7 the Arms Export Control Act,8 and the Foreign
AssistanceAct,9 “including restrictions onU.S. foreign assistance; a banondefense exports and
sales; certain controls over exports of dual use items; and miscellaneous financial and other
restrictions.”10
In July 2015, Obama announced that the United States had agreed to formally re-establish
diplomatic relations withCuba and that the countries were planning to reopen their respective
embassies.11Kerry noted at the time thatwhile “[t]heUnited States andCuba continue to have
sharpdifferences over democracy, human rights, and related issues . . . [t]he resumptionof full
embassy activities will help us engage the Cuban Government more often and at a higher
level.”12 Later thatmonth, Assistant Secretary of State Roberta Jackson led theU.S. delegation
2 Cuba Policy Changes, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Rescission of Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terror, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 29, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2015/05/242986.htm [hereinafter Rescission of Cuba].
5 By statute, the President was required to submit a report toCongress forty-five days before the proposed rescis-
sion would take effect certifying that the Cuban government has not provided support for any acts of international
terrorism in the past six months and has assured the United States that it will not provide support for terrorism in
the future. SeeExport Administration Act of 1979 § 6(j), 50 App. U.S.C. § 2405 (2012); Arms Export Control Act
§ 40, 22U.S.C. § 2780 (2012); ForeignAssistanceAct of 1961§620A22U.S.C. § 2371 (2012).The StateDepart-
ment noted that “[w]hile the United States has significant concerns and disagreements with a wide range of Cuba’s
policies and actions, these fall outside the criteria relevant to the rescission of a State Sponsor of Terrorism desig-
nation.” Rescission of Cuba, supra note 4.
6 Rescission of Cuba, supra note 4.
7 Export AdministrationAct of 1979 § 6(j), 50 App.U.S.C. § 2405 (2012); see alsoCuba: ImplementingRescis-
sion of State Sponsor of TerrorismDesignation, 80 Fed. Reg. 43,314 (final rule effective July 22, 2015) (to be cod-
ified at 15 C.F.R. pts. 734, 736, 740, 742, 746, 748, 750, 758, 772, 774) (amending the Export Administration
Regulations to implement the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a State Sponsor of Terror).
8 22 U.S.C. § 2780.
9 Id. § 2371.
10 State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited
July 20, 2015).
11 Statement by the President on the Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, THE WHITE HOUSE
( July 1, 2015), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/01/statement-president-re-establish-
ment-diplomatic-relations-cuba [hereinafter Diplomatic Relations with Cuba]. The announcement came after the
exchange of presidential letters between the U.S. and Cuban Interests Sections declaring mutual intent to re-es-
tablish diplomatic relations and re-open embassies on July 20, 2015. Re-Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with
Cuba: Fact Sheet, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 6, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/07/
244623.htm.
12 Statement on Cuba, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 1, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/
07/244542.htm.
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in formally opening theU.S.Embassy inHavana.13OnAugust 14, 2015,Kerry personally pre-
sided over the flag-raising at the U.S. Embassy, becoming the first secretary of state to travel
to Cuba since 1945.14 Kerry emphasized that Cuba and theUnited States are “neighbors” that
will always have things to discuss “in such areas as civil aviation, migration policy, disaster pre-
paredness, protecting marine environment, [and] global climate change.”15
In themeantime, theDepartments of Treasury andCommerce have implementednew reg-
ulations on travel and remittances to Cuba.16 The Departments issued licenses to at least four
passenger ferry companies,17 to Carnival Cruise Lines,18 and to JetBlue Airlines for charter
flights from New York to Havana.19 Kerry stated in his remarks at the flag-raising ceremony
in Havana that travel from the United States to Cuba has already increased by 35 percent in
2015 as a result of these measures.20
The administration takes the position that it cannot eliminate the broader trade embargo
on Cuba without congressional action.While the president has statutory authority to end the
embargo under the Cuban Democracy Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,21 the cir-
cumstances under which he can exercise this power are extremely limited. TheCubanDemoc-
racy Act allows the president to waive the sanctions if he determines that the Cuban govern-
ment has held free and fair elections under internationally recognized observers, is moving
towards establishing a free market system, and has committed itself to constitutional change,
among other things.22 The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 prescribes
a process by which the president may suspend the entire embargo, including sanctions man-
dated by both the Cuban Democracy Act as well and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, but
it requires the president to determine that a transition government is in power in Cuba23 and
provides that Congress can nullify the president’s determination by a joint resolution.24
13 Statement by the Press Secretary on the Opening of the Embassy of the United States in Havana, Cuba and the
Opening of the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C., THE WHITE HOUSE ( July 20, 2015), at https://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/07/20/statement-press-secretary-opening-embassy-united-states-america-
havana. See also Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, supra note 11 (“The U.S. Embassy will continue to perform the
existing functions of the U.S. Interests Section, including consular services, operation of a political and economic
section, implementation of a public diplomacy program, andwill continue to promote respect for human rights.”).
14 Secretary Kerry’s Remarks at Flag Raising Ceremony, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 14, 2015), at http://www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/08/246121.htm [hereinafter Flag Raising Ceremony].
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS RELATED TO CUBA (May 5,
2015), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/cuba_faqs_new.
pdf.
17 Doreen Hemlock & Arlene Satchel, At Least Four Florida Companies Approved for Ferry Service to Cuba,
SUN SENTINEL (May 5, 2015), at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/business/tourism/fl-havana-ferry-approval-
20150505-story.html.
18 Carnival Corporation Granted U.S. Approval for Travel to Cuba, FATHOM IMPACT TRAVEL ( July 7, 2015),
at https://www.fathom.org/carnival-corporation-granted-u-s-approval-for-travel-to-cuba.
19 Governor Cuomo, JetBlue, Cuba Travel Services Announce Direct Charter Flight From New York to Havana,
NEW YORK STATE (May 5, 2015), at https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-jetblue-cuba-travel-
services-announce-direct-charter-flight-new-york-havana.
20 John Kerry, Why I’m Going to Havana, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 14, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2015/08/246124.htm.
21 See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6007, 6063, 6064 (2012).
22 Id. § 6007.
23 Id. §§ 6064, 6065.
24 Id. § 6064.
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Should the president determine that a democratically elected government is actually in power
in Cuba, then the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 mandates the stat-
utory repeal of the embargo.25
Despite bipartisan support in Congress in favor of removing the embargo entirely,26 influ-
ential critics have opposed efforts to enact enabling legislation for that purpose andhave threat-
ened to derail the president’s efforts to re-establish relations in other respects as well.27
Although executive action has relaxed some trade restrictions, for example, by raising themin-
imummonetary amount at which trade restrictions apply, the bulk of trade and travel restric-
tions with Cuba remain intact.28 Having acknowledged in December that removing the
embargo would require legislative action, Obama has become increasingly vocal about Con-
gress’s failure so far to facilitate this outcome.29
The embargo remains a key obstacle in the ongoing normalization process. In December,
Cuban President Raul Castromaintained that “the heart of thematter” remains unresolved.30
He stated that “[t]he economic, commercial, and financial blockade, which causes enormous
human and economic damages to our country,must cease.”31 In the face of congressional inac-
tion, it appears that the executive branchmay be considering the use of a bilateral international
agreement to ease travel restrictions. As a spokesperson for the Department of State acknowl-
edged, “reaching an agreement . . . would provide more options than we currently have to
25 Id. § 6064, 6066.
26 See S. 491, 114th Cong. (2015) (introduced byDemocratic Senator Amy Klobuchar); S. 1543, 114th Cong.
(2015) (introduced by Republican Senator Jerry Moran).
27 Some of themost outspoken critics are Senators TedCruz [R-TX], BobMenendez [D-NJ], andMarcoRubio
[R-FL]. SenatorMenendez stated that Secretary Kerry’s visit to Cuba is “a validation of the Castro regime’s repres-
sive policies.” Menendez Statement on American Embassy Opening in Cuba, BOB MENENDEZ FOR NEW JERSEY
(Aug. 14, 2015), at http://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-statement-on-american-
embassy-opening-in-cuba. And referring to the Senate’s role in confirmation hearings, Rubio has stated, “I will
make sure that the embassy you are opening in Havana will not have a U.S. ambassador unless, at the very least,
we see real political reforms and progress on human rights, the return to theU.S. of harbored terrorists and fugitives
to face justice, and the resolution of outstanding American property claims and judgments against the Cuban gov-
ernment.” Letter fromMarco Rubio, United States Senator, to John Kerry, United States Secretary of State (Aug.
10, 2015), available at http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?afiles.serve&File_id46755E9E-446D-
495D-ADDC-294A6ED2131C.
28 Cuba: Implementing Rescission of State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation, supra note 7. Multiple senators
and representatives have introduced bills into Congress that try to remove the embargo, but all of the bills have so
far stalled in committee. See e.g., S. 491, 114th Congress (2015) (removing all trade restrictions); S. 1543, 114th
Congress (2015) (removing all trade restrictions); H.R. 3238, 114th Congress (2015) (removing all trade restric-
tions).
29 Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, supra note 11 (“I’ve called on Congress to take steps to lift the embargo that
prevents Americans from travelling or doing business in Cuba. . . . After all, why should Washington stand in the
way of our own people?”); see also Flag Raising Ceremony, supra note 14 (“We are all aware that notwithstanding
PresidentObama’s new policy, the overall U.S. embargo on trade withCuba remains in place and can only be lifted
by congressional action-a step that we strongly favor.”).
30 Speech by President Raul Castro on Re-Establishing U.S.-Cuba Relations,WASH.POST,Dec. 17,2014,available athttps://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/full-text-speech-by-cuban-president-raul-castro-on-re-establishing-us-cuba-relations/
2014/12/17/45bc2f88-8616-11e4-b9b7-b8632ae73d25_story.html.
31 Id.
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facilitate authorized travel to Cuba.”32 But the spokesperson was careful to note that “discus-
sions are ongoing,” and that theU.S. andCubangovernmentshavenot come to any such agree-
ment yet.33 Other issues also remain outstanding, including the resolution of American citi-
zens’ ownership claims regarding property in Cuba.34
INTERNATIONALOCEANS, ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND AVIATION LAW
U.S. Navy Continues Freedom of Navigation and Overflight Missions in the South China Sea
Despite China’s “Island-Building” Campaign
For decades, China has laid claim to around 80 percent of the South China Sea, publishing
atlases with the so-called “nine-dash line” as early as the 1950s.1 In defending these territorial
claims against criticism and competing claims from other states,2 China sometimes has cited
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and at other times has invoked “his-
torical practice” for its claims.3 Last year, echoing the rationale of former Secretary of StateHil-
lary Clinton,4 Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel challenged China’s claims that were
not based on “land features.”5
Various claimants, including China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Taiwan, have
sought to influence the legal dispute by “develop[ing] outposts over the years of differing scope
and degree.”6 China has recently accelerated what it calls an “island-building” project in the
Spratly Islands,7 a contested area that contains great fishing resources and potentially large oil
and gas reserves.8 Specifically, China is conducting massive land reclamation projects, dredg-
ing sand and rock from under water and depositing it topside.9 Since November 2013, China
32 Daily Press Briefing, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 18, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2015/
08/246175.htm#CUBA.
33 Id.
34 Julie Hirschfeld Davis, As U.S. and Cuba Relations Warm, Property Claim Issue is Revived, N.Y. TIMES, July
19, 2015, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/20/world/americas/as-us-and-cuba-relations-
warm-property-claims-issue-is-revived.html.
1 Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 108 AJIL 321,
331 (2014). See generally Zhiguo Gao&Bing Bing Jia, The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status,
and Implications, 107 AJIL 98 (2013). For amap depicting the nine-dash line, see Lori Fisler Damrosch&Bernard
H. Oxman, Editors’ Introduction to Agora: The South China Sea, 107 AJIL 95, 96 (2013).
2 Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense, Statement at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue: “A Regional Security Archi-
tecture Where Everyone Rises” (May 30, 2015), available at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?
SpeechID1945.
3 Id.
4 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Remarks at Press Availability in Hanoi, Vietnam, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July
23, 2010), at http:// www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm.
5 Daniel R. Russel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Testimony Before the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific (Feb. 5, 2014), at http://www.state.gov/p/
eap/rls/rm/2014/02/221293.htm.
6 Carter, supra note 2.
7 DerekWatkins, What China Has Been Building in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2015, at http://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.
html.
8 Gao & Jia, supra note 1, at 99–100.
9 Id.
2015] 667CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 18:05:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
has reclaimed more than 2,000 acres—more than the rest of the other Spratly claimants com-
bined.10
At the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Shangri-La Dialogue inMay 2015, U.S.
Defense Secretary Ashton Carter detailed the United States’ position:
[W]ewant a peaceful resolution of all disputes. To that end, there should be an immediate
and lasting halt to land reclamation by all claimants. We also oppose any further milita-
rization of disputed features.We all know there is nomilitary solution to the SouthChina
Sea disputes. Right now, at this critical juncture, is the time for renewed diplomacy,
focused on a finding a lasting solution that protects the rights and the interests of all. As
it is central to the regional security architecture, ASEAN [the Association of South East
Asian Nations] must be a part of this effort: the United States encourages ASEAN and
China to conclude a Code of Conduct this year. And America will support the right of
claimants to pursue international legal arbitration and other peaceful means to resolve
these disputes, just as we will oppose coercive tactics. . . .
[W]ith its actions in the South China Sea, China is out of step with both the international
rules and norms that underscore the Asia-Pacific’s security architecture, and the regional
consensus that favors diplomacy and opposes coercion. . . .
TheUnitedStateswill always standwith its allies andpartners. It’s important for the region
to understand that America is go[ing to] remain engaged, continue to stand up for inter-
national law and universal principles, and help provide security and stability in the Asia-
Pacific for decades to come.11
In July 2015, Russel further elaborated the United States’ position on these questions, sug-
gesting that China’s land reclamation projects might in themselves violate the 2002 ASEAN
Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, which obliges all claimants “to exercise self-
restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace
and stability including, among others, refraining from . . . inhabiting the presently uninhab-
ited . . . features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.”12
China responded to Carter’s criticism directly:
First, China’s sovereignty and relevant claims of rights in the South China Sea have been
formed in the long course of history and upheld by successive Chinese governments. This
position has adequate historical and legal basis. There is no need to have it reinforced
through construction activities on relevant islands and reefs.
Second, China’s constructionwork on some garrisoned islands and reefs of the [Spratly]13
Islands is totally within China’s sovereignty. It is lawful, reasonable and justified, not
affecting or targeting any other countries.Once finished, the constructionworkwill equip
the islands and reefs with diversified and integrated functionswhich aremainly for civilian
uses, apart from satisfying necessary military defense needs. . . .
10 Carter, supra note 2.
11 Id.
12 Remarks at the Fifth Annual South China Sea Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE ( July 21, 2015), at http://
www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2015/07/245142.htm (quoting Ass’n of Southeast AsianNations,Declaration on the
Conduct of theParties in theSouthChinaSea,¶5,Nov. 4, 2002, athttp://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/
china/item/declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea).
13 Editors’ note: China uses the name “Nansha Islands” instead of “Spartly Islands.”
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Third, as a major country, China shoulders more international responsibilities and obli-
gations. China is conducting construction activities at a pace and with a scale befitting her
international responsibilities and obligations in the fields such as maritime search and res-
cue, disaster prevention and mitigation, meteorological observation, ecological conserva-
tion, navigation safety and fishery services in the South China Sea. These activities are
designed to serve practical needs and provide better services to the ships of China, her
neighbors and other countries passing through the South China Sea.
Fourth, for a long period of time, there has never been any problem concerning the free-
dom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea that all countries are entitled to
under the international law. Nor will there be any in the future. However, countries must
not abuse the freedom of navigation and overflight, still less shall they take the freedom as
an excuse to infringe upon the sovereignty, rights and security of coastal countries that are
protected by the international law. China’s construction activities will not undermine
countries’ freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea. On the contrary,
it will facilitate joint response to challenges on the sea and providemore guarantees for the
safety of navigation.
Fifth, China and ASEAN countries havemade it clear that the issue of the SouthChina Sea
shall be addressed through the “dual-track approach,” whichmeans that relevant disputes
shall be resolved by countries directly concerned through negotiation and consultation,
andpeace and stability of the SouthChinaSea shall be jointly upheldbyChina andASEAN
countries. Under the framework of fully and effectively implementing theDeclaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), China and ASEAN countries are
pressing aheadwith theCOC[codeof conduct in theSouthChinaSea] consultation, striv-
ing to reach an agreement based on consensus at an early date. We have seen important
progress. TheCOC, in essence, is amatter betweenChina andASEAN countries, and thus
should be jointly made by China and ASEAN countries through consultation on an equal
footing. It is hoped that the US and other countries outside the region will fully respect
efforts by China and ASEAN countries in this regard instead of adding complicated ele-
ments to the consultation process.
Sixth, the US is not a party to the South China Sea issue. It is not and shall not become
an issue between China and the US. We strongly urge the US to keep the big picture of
China-US relationship and regional peace and stability in mind, honor its commitment
of not taking sides on issues concerning territorial sovereignty, show earnest respect to
regional countries’ efforts to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea, be dis-
creet with words and deeds and refrain from any of them that are detrimental to peace and
stability in the South China Sea and China-US relations.14
For its part, the United States has made a point of acting in accordance with its views on the
territorial status of the disputed territory.15 As Carter put it in May:
[T]he United States will continue to protect freedom of navigation and overflight—prin-
ciples that have ensured security and prosperity in this region for decades. There should
be no mistake: the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law
allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world. America, alongside its allies and partners in the
regional architecture, will not be deterred from exercising these rights—the rights of all
14 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on US Defense Secretary Carter’s Speech Relating to the
Issue of the South China Sea at the Shangri-La Dialogue, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (May 30, 2015),
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1268781.shtml.
15 See Carter, supra note 2.
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nations. After all, turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the
rights of sovereignty or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit.16
Secretary of State John Kerry made similar remarks at the recent East Asia Summit.17 Accord-
ingly—and despite China’s claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys—the U.S. Navy has
deployed ships and aircraft to the region, and on at least one occasion this year flew a low-al-
titude surveillance aircraft over some of China’s land reclamation projects, during which Chi-
nese radio controllers told U.S. Navy pilots they were violating Chinese airspace.18 U.S. Navy
pilots responded that they were lawfully in international airspace over international waters.19
Though aU.S.Navy admiral characterized the flyover as “routine” and the exchanges between
the United States andChina as “positive and structured,” China’s DefenseMinistry described
the flyover as part of the United States’ “frequent, widespread, close-in surveillance of China,
seriously harmingbilateralmutual trust andChina’s security interests,which could easily cause
an accident at sea or in the air.”20
The next month, China announced that its island-building projects were nearing comple-
tion:
It is learned from relevant Chinese competent departments that, as planned, the land rec-
lamation project of China’s construction on some stationed islands and reefs of the
[Spratly] Islands will be completed in the upcoming days.
Apart from satisfying the need of necessary military defense, the main purpose of China’s
construction activities is to meet various civilian demands and better perform China’s
international obligations and responsibilities in the areas such as maritime search and res-
cue, disaster prevention and mitigation, marine scientific research, meteorological obser-
vation, ecological environment conservation, navigation safety as well as fishery produc-
tion service. After the land reclamation, we will start the building of facilities to meet
relevant functional requirements.21
16 Id.
17 See Intervention at the East Asia Summit, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Aug. 6, 2015), at http://www.state.gov/sec-
retary/remarks/2015/08/245758.htm.
18 E.g., SimonDenyer,Chinese Warnings to U.S. Plane Hint of Rising Stakes over Disputed Islands,WASH. POST,
May, 21, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/chinese-warnings-to-us-plane-
hint-of-rising-stakes-over-disputed-islands/2015/05/21/381fffd6-8671-420b-b863-57d092ccac2d_story.html;
see also South China Sea: China’s Navy Told US Spy Plane Flying over Islands to Leave ‘Eight Times’, CNN Reports,
ABC NEWS (May, 21, 2015), at http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-22/us-spy-plane-in-south-china-sea-
warned-to-leave-by-china/6488690 [hereinafter China’s Navy] (“At one stage . . . a Chinese radio operator said
with exasperation: ‘This is the Chinese navy . . . you go!’ . . . ‘We were just challenged 30 minutes ago and the
challenge came from theChinese navy,’ saidCaptainMike Parker, commander ofUS surveillance aircraft deployed
to Asia. ‘I’m highly confident it came from ashore, this facility here,’ he said, pointing to an early warning radar
station on Fiery Cross Reef.” (second ellipsis in original)).
19 China’s Navy, supra note 17 (“A spokeswoman for theUS state department saidUS planes operated ‘in accor-
dancewith international law in disputed areas of the SouthChina Sea’ andwould continue to do so ‘consistent with
the rights freedoms and lawful uses of the sea.’”). For an overview of the recently adopted Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES), see Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 108 AJIL 516, 529 (2014).
20 Michelle FlorCruz, US Navy South China Sea Surveillance Flyover Harmed Bilateral Relations: Beijing Defense
Officials, INT’L BUS. TIMES ( July 20, 2015), at http://www.ibtimes.com/us-navy-south-china-sea-surveillance-
flyover-harmed-bilateral-relations-beijing-2015737.
21 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Remarks on Issues Relating to China’s Construction Activities on the Nan-
sha Islands and Reefs, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA ( June 16, 2015), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/2535_665405/t1273370.shtml.
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At the August ASEANmeeting, in response to questions fromPhilippines and Japan, China
reiterated its position on the Spratlys:
First, the situation in the SouthChina Sea is stable on thewhole, and there is no possibility
of major conflicts. China therefore objects to any non-constructive words or deeds that
attempt to exaggerate the disagreements, hype up confrontation and heat up tensions,
which do not conform to reality.
China also has a stake in the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. The majority
of Chinese cargo are shipped through the South China Sea, so freedom of navigation in
the SouthChina Sea is equally important toChina. China alwaysmaintains that countries
enjoy freedom of navigation and overflight in the SouthChina Sea in accordance with the
international law. Up to now, there has not been a single case in which freedom of nav-
igation in the South China Sea is impeded. China stands ready to work with other parties
to continue to ensure freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea.
As for the disputes on [the Spratly] islands and reefs, this is a long-standing issue. The
South China Sea Islands are China’s territory. There is a history of two thousand years
since China discovered and named the islands in the South China Sea. . . . According to
international law, China has the right to defend its sovereignty, rights and interests, and
Chinahas the right to prevent the repeat of such illegalmoves as encroachinguponChina’s
lawful rights and interests.22
Chinawent on to suggest that its island-building projects found precedent in similar actions
by other states in the region:
[I]n 1999, the Philippines illegally “stranded” an old warship on the Ren’ai Reef, which
is part of China’s Nansha Islands. When China made representations, the Philippines
claimed that it could not tow the warship away due to “the lack of spare parts.” Later, the
Philippine side indicated to theChinese side that itwouldnot be thefirst country to violate
the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). Now 15 years
have passed and the old warship has already become extremely rusty. The Philippines,
instead of keeping its promise of removing the warship, has publicly stated that it had
stealthily transported cement and other buildingmaterials to the warship in order to rein-
force the installation. On 14March, theDepartment of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines
admitted that the very purpose of grounding thewarship on theRen’ai Reef was to occupy
it. The Philippines has exposed its own lie of 15 years and failed to fulfill its own commit-
ment. What international credibility is there in the conduct of the Philippines?23
China then asserted that Japan has engaged in island building and that China is actually the
“victim” in the current situation:
Just now, the delegate of Japan alsomentioned the SouthChina Sea issue and claimed that
all artificial land features cannot generate any legal rights. But let’s first have a look at what
Japan has done. Over the past years, Japan spent 10 billion yen building the Rock of Oki-
notori, turning this tiny rock on the sea into aman-made islandwith steel bars and cement.
And on that basis, Japan submitted its claim to the United Nations over the continental
shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. The majority members of
the international community found Japan’s claim inconceivable and did not accept it. So
22 Wang Yi on the South China Sea Issue at the ASEAN Regional Forum, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA
(Aug. 6, 2015), at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1287277.shtml.
23 Id.
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before making comments on others, Japan had better first reflect on what itself has said or
done.China is different from Japan.Our claimover rights in the SouthChina Sea has long
been in existence. We don’t need to strengthen our position through land reclamation.24
China concluded by explaining that its land reclamation projects had been completed and
that future developments in the Spratlys would be civilian in nature and benefit all claimants:
As for the land reclamation in the South China Sea which is of interest to some countries,
it is nothing new and does not start withChina. In otherwords, people have been bringing
changes to the “status quo” all these years. Itwas only recently thatChina, for the first time,
carried out certain construction on some stationed islands and reefs in the [Spratly] Islands
in order to improve the working and living conditions of personnel there. In the process,
wehave enforced strict environmental standards.At the endof June,China announced the
completion of land reclamation. Next, we will build facilities mainly for public good pur-
poses, including multi-functional lighthouse, search and rescue facilities for maritime
emergencies, meteorological observatory station, maritime scientific and research center,
as well asmedical and first aid facilities. China stands ready to open these facilities to other
countries upon completion. As the largest littoral state in the South China Sea, China has
the capability and obligation to provide regional countries with thesemuch needed public
goods at sea.25
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ANDU.S. REGULATION OF FOREIGN ENTERPRISES
U.S. Department of Justice Charges Leaders of FIFA, Affiliate Soccer Organizations, and Sports
Marketing Companies in 47-Count Indictment
OnMay 27, 2015, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed a 47-count indictment against
high-ranking officials of the Fe´de´ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) as well
as leaders of affiliate soccer organizations and executives of multinational sports companies.1
“The indictment alleges corruption that is rampant, systemic, and deep-rooted both abroad
and here in theUnited States,” saidU.S. AttorneyGeneral Loretta Lynch.2 A grand jury in the
Eastern District of New York indicted fourteen defendants on charges that include racketeer-
ing, wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracies.3
The indictment details more than a dozen alleged schemes, which span twenty-four years
and implicate multiple generations of corporate leadership.4 Altogether, leaders of FIFA and
affiliate organizations are accused of soliciting and acceptingmore than $150million in bribes
and kickbacks in exchange for media and marketing rights to popular soccer tournaments.5
The charges also include allegations of bribery related to the selection of the host nation for the
24 Id.
25 Id.
1 Nine FIFA Officials and Five Corporate Executives Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 27, 2015), at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officials-and-five-corporate-exec-
utives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and [hereinafter Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption].
2 Id.
3 Indictment at 113–48, United States v. Webb et. al. (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2015) (No. 1:15-cr-00252-RJD),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/file/450211/download (detailing alleged violations of Title 18, U.S.C.,
Sections 1343, 1349, 1956, 1957, 1962, 1963, and 3551) [hereinafter Indictment U.S. v. Webb].
4 Id.
5 Id.
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2010 World Cup and the 2011 election of the FIFA president.6 As summarized by Lynch,
“these individuals and organizations engaged in bribery to decide who would televise games;
where the gameswould be held; andwhowould run the organization overseeing organized soc-
cer worldwide.”7
Since its establishment in 1904, FIFA has expanded to become the governing of body of
organized soccer worldwide.8 Technically an entity registered under Swiss law, FIFA now
encompasses six confederations that correspond roughly to the continental divides.9 Each con-
tinental confederation serves as an umbrella for its constituent regional federations, which in
turn consist of national member associations.10 FIFA describes itself as “an association of asso-
ciations with a non-commercial, not for profit purpose” of regulating, organizing, and devel-
oping the game of soccer.11 FIFA and its affiliates finance this mission in part by commercial-
izing the media and marketing rights to high-profile soccer games within their respective
jurisdictions.12 They contract with sports media and marketing companies, which subse-
quently sell these rights to radio and television broadcasters, corporate sponsors, and other sub-
licensees.13 According to the indictment, soccer officials have exploited these valuable rights
for more than two decades by conditioning their licensing decisions on offers and payments
of bribes and kickbacks from sports company executives.14
Among the schemes alleged in the 161-page indictment is a 2004 plot by JackWarner, then
amember of FIFA’s primary decisionmaking body and president of both theCaribbean Foot-
ball Union (CFU) and the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Asso-
ciation Football (CONCACAF).15 According to the prosecution, Warner accepted bribes in
exchange for his vote in FIFA’s secret ballot for the 2010 World Cup host nation.16 At one
point, he allegedly directed a co-conspirator to fly to Paris, France and accept a briefcase with
stacks of $10,000 bills from another co-conspirator in a clandestine bid for Warner’s vote.17
AfterWarner allegedly accepted an offer by the South African government to pay $10million
to theCFU,Warner ultimately voted for South Africa, whichwent on to host the 2010World
Cup.18 The prosecution also claims that a significant portion of this bribe was wired through
6 Id. at 133–34.
7 AttorneyGeneralLorettaE.LynchDeliversRemarks atPressConferenceAnnouncingChargesAgainstNineFIFAOfficials and
Five Corporate Executives, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 27, 2015), at http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-
loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-press-conference-announcing-charges [hereinafter Lynch Delivers Remarks].
8 About FIFA: Who We Are, FIFA, at http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-we-are/index.html (last visited July
15, 2015); see also Indictment U.S. v. Webb, supra note 3, at 1–3.
9 FIFA STATUTES, APRIL 2015 EDITION 6, 17 (2015), available at http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/
affederation/generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatutesen_neutral.pdf.
10 Associations, FIFA, at http://www.fifa.com/associations/ (last visited July 15, 2015).
11 FAQ: Setting the Record Straight, FIFA, athttp://www.fifa.com/mm/document/tournament/competition/02/
36/32/63/faq_en_neutral.pdf (last visited July 15, 2015).
12 See IndictmentU.S. v.Webb, supranote 3, at 7 (referencingFIFA’s published income statement for the 2007–
2010 and 2011–2014financial periods, inwhich FIFA attributed 83%and70%of its respective $4.189 billion and
$5.718 billion in revenue to the sale of television and marketing rights for upcoming World Cups).
13 Racketeering Conspiracy and Corruption, supra note 1.
14 Indictment U.S. v. Webb, supra note 3, at 31–47.
15 Id. at 80–86.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 81.
18 Id. at 82.
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bank accounts inNewYork anddiverted forWarner’s personal use.19Whenauthorities uncov-
ered one of his subsequent schemes,Warner reportedly said, “[t]here are somepeople herewho
think they are more pious than thou. If you’re pious, open a church, friends. Our business is
our business.”20
Thirteenof the fourteen indicteddefendants, including JackWarner, arenotU.S. citizens.21
Although many of the allegations involve conduct committed by foreign citizens abroad, the
U.S. Department of Justice did not rely on statutes that regulate extraterritorial conduct in
order to charge the defendants in U.S. federal court. Rather, the prosecution relied on the
defendants’ use of American banks andmeeting locations.22 According to the indictment, the
defendants distributed bribe payments using major U.S. financial institutions and wire facil-
ities,23 and they conducted illicit business meetings at the CONCACAF headquarters in New
York and other domestic locations.24 Some defendants are also accused of profiting from the
exploitation of illegally obtained media and marketing rights via U.S.-based radio and televi-
sion networks.25
Russia has criticized the indictment as “yet another example of arbitrary extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. law.”26 Immediately after the charges were unsealed, a spokesperson for
the Russian foreign ministry called onWashington to “cease its attempts to initiate court pro-
ceedings far beyond its borders with its own legal standards, and to follow universally accepted
international legal procedures.”27 A high-ranking U.S. Justice Department official later told
an audience of global fraud examiners that “[f]ar from acting as the world’s corruption police,
the United States is part of a formidable and growing coalition of international enforcement
partners who together combat corruption around the world. . . .”28 After highlighting the
FIFA case as “a profound illustration of the success that can be achieved through a truly global
coalition,” Assistant Attorney General Leslie Caldwell reiterated that “[t]he Department of
Justice is never going to serve as the world’s global police force.”29
In the days and weeks following the unsealing of the indictment, thirteen of the fourteen
defendants were arrested by law enforcement authorities in the United States, Switzerland,
19 Id. at 83.
20 Id. at 92–93.
21 Id. at 14–22 (listing the defendants, including executives of sportsmedia andmarketing businesses headquar-
tered in theUnited States and abroad; officials of FIFA, continental soccer confederations, and constituent regional
and national associations; and intermediaries who allegedly facilitated the distribution of bribes).
22 Id. at 1–14.
23 E.g., Indictment U.S. v. Webb, supra note 3, at 39–41, 54–59, 106–07 (detailing wire communications
between U.S. and foreign financial institutions).
24 Id. at 85, 98, 101.
25 Id. at 61–89.
26 Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on the arrest of FIFA officials, MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFF. OF THE RUSS. FED’N (May 27, 2015), at http://archive.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/
e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/e7d8e10011cedad043257e530039eb92!OpenDocument.
27 Id.
28 Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell Delivers Remarks at the 26th Annual Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners Global Fraud Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ( June 15, 2015), at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
speech/assistant-attorney-general-leslie-r-caldwell-delivers-remarks-26th-annual-association.
29 Id.
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Trinidad and Tobago, Paraguay, Italy, and Argentina.30 Five of the arrests were effectuated
after INTERPOL issued international wanted person alerts (known as “Red Notices”) at the
request ofU.S. authorities.31 Since then,U.S. embassies have requested that the foreign defen-
dants be extradited in order to face their charges in the Eastern District of New York.32 Two
defendants voluntarily agreed to be extradited and have since been arraigned in U.S. federal
court.33The others are fighting extradition to theUnited States, including five defendantswho
are currently awaiting decisions from the Swiss Federal Office of Justice.34 According to the
bilateral extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland, Swiss authorizes must
determine whether any of the alleged offenses are punishable by a year or more in jail under
both U.S. and Swiss law.35 Even if this “dual criminality” rule is met, the defendants may not
appear in U.S. court for months given their right to appeal extradition rulings in two higher
Swiss courts.36 One defendant remains free in Brazil, where the constitution forbids extradi-
tion of its citizens unless they are chargedwith drug trafficking or crimes that predate their nat-
uralization.37
The U.S. Department of Justice “expressed appreciation for the cooperation and assistance
we received from our international partners, particularly the Swiss authorities.”38 The Swiss
FederalOffice of Justice carried out theU.S. arrest requests and compliedwith additionalU.S.
requests for legal assistance by blocking accounts at several Swiss banks and seizing related bank
30 Letter Providing Case Update at 1–2, United States v. Webb et. al., (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 2015) (No. 1:15-
cr-00252-RJD) [hereinafter Letter ProvidingCaseUpdate], available athttp://www.plainsite.org/dockets/2lowqz-
vyi/new-york-eastern-district-court/usa-v-webb-et-al; see also Matt Apuzzo et. al., FIFA Officials Arrested on Cor-
ruption Charges; Blatter Isn’t Among Them,N.Y.TIMES,May26, 2015, atA1,available athttp://www.nytimes.com/
2015/05/27/sports/soccer/fifa-officials-face-corruption-charges-in-us.html.
31 Letter Providing Case Update, supra note 30, at 2; see also INTERPOL Issues Red Notices for Former FIFA Offi-
cials and Executives Wanted by U.S. Authorities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ( June 3, 2015), at http://www.justice.gov/
interpol-washington/pr/interpol-issues-red-notices-former-fifa-officials-and-executives-wanted-us.
32 See, e.g.,USA Asks Switzerland to Extradite the Seven Detained FIFA Officials,FED.OFF.OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.)
( July 2, 2015), at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-07-02.html.
33 FIFA Official Agrees to Extradition to USA, FED.OFF. OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.) ( July 10, 2015), at https://www.
bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-07-10.html; Noah Remnick, Jeffrey Webb, Top FIFA Official,
Pleads Not Guilty in Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2015, at SP5, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/07/19/sports/soccer/jeffrey-webb-top-fifa-official-pleads-not-guilty-in-corruption-case.html; Argentine
Willing to be Extradited to U.S. in FIFA Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS ( June 10, 2015), at http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/2015/06/10/world/americas/ap-soc-fifa-investigation-burzaco.html; Rebecca R. Ruiz, Argentine Busi-
nessman Pleads Not Guilty in FIFA Corruption Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2015, at D6, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/sports/soccer/in-fifa-corruption-case-alejandro-burzaco-of-argentina-
pleads-not-guilty.html.
34 Majority of Arrested Individuals Contesting Extradition to the USA, FED.OFF. OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.) (May 27,
2015), at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-05-271.html; Julio Rocha Agrees to
Extradition to Nicaragua, FED. OFF. OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.) (Aug. 14, 2015), at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/
home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-08-14.html; Rebecca R. Ruiz, How the 14 Indicted FIFA Defendants Currently
Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2015, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/08/sports/soccer/how-14-in-
dicted-fifa-officials-currently-stand.html.
35 Stephanie Nebehay, Swiss Expect to Decide on FIFA Extraditions in September, REUTERS (Aug. 25, 2015), at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/25/soccer-fifa-swiss-idUSL5N11033F20150825.
36 USA Asks Switzerland to Extradite the Seven Detained FIFA Officials, FED. OFF. OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.) ( July
2, 2015), at https://www.bj.admin.ch/bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-07-02.html.
37 BradHaynes,Executive Charged in FIFA Soccer Probe Now Back in Brazil, REUTERS ( June16, 2015), athttp://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/16/us-soccer-fifa-brazil-extradition-idUSKBN0OW2LX20150616.
38 Lynch Delivers Remarks, supra note 7.
2015] 675CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
This content downloaded from 141.211.57.203 on Wed, 06 Jan 2016 18:05:34 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
documents.39 Swiss authorities also seized approximately nine terabytes of electronic evidence
during a sweep of FIFA’s head office in Zurich, which will provide evidence for criminal pro-
ceedings in both Switzerland and abroad.40 TheOffice of the AttorneyGeneral of Switzerland
is conducting an investigation separate from that of the United States. Swiss authorities are
focused on the allocation of the 2018 and 2022World Cups and have repeatedly emphasized
that “Swiss and U.S. law enforcement authorities are not conducting any joint investigations,
but are coordinating their respective criminal proceedings.”41
Although Switzerland is the only foreign country that has publicized its cooperation with
U.S. evidence requests, theU.S. government has submitted similar requests to numerous other
countries pursuant to mutual legal assistance treaties.42 Foreign governments have also
requested information from theUnited States, as evidenced by a request from the Argentinian
government to the U.S. District Court for the release of information related to the charges
against the Argentinian defendants.43 With only three defendants arraigned to date, the U.S.
investigation is ongoing through thework of theNewYork FieldOffice of the FBI and the Los
Angeles Field Office of the IRS’s Criminal Investigation Division.44 Lynch has made it clear
that the Department of Justice plans to expand its prosecution by collaborating with interna-
tional allies in the campaign against corruption.45 “Going forward,” she said, “wewelcome the
opportunity to work with our partners around the world to bring additional co-conspirators
and other corrupt individuals to justice.”46
39 Names of the Persons Arrested, FED.OFF. OF JUSTICE (SWITZ.) (May 27, 2015), at https://www.bj.admin.ch/
bj/en/home/aktuell/news/2015/2015-05-270.html.
40 The Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland Seizes Documents at FIFA, FED. COUNCIL (SWITZ.) (May
27, 2015), at https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-57391.html.
41 Id.
42 Letter Providing Case Update, supra note 30, at 4.
43 See, e.g., Letter dated 6/30/15 from Manuel Garrido, Member of the Argentine House of Representatives,
United States v. Webb et. al. (E.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015) (No. 1:15-cr-00252-RJD). The letter was directed to the
wrong judge, but she wrote back and advised Mr. Garrido to contact the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of
New York for further information.
44 Lynch Delivers Remarks, supra note 7.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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